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While public production or Pigovian
taxes might correct for market failures,
theory cannot solve the problem without
a detailed analysis of the institutional
structure of the problem at hand.
In 1991, Ronald H. Coase received the
Nobel prize for his work on the role of transac-
tion costs in economics. His paper on “The
Nature of the Firm” (Coase 1937) introduced
transaction costs as the primary reason for the
existence of firms. Coase pointed out that firms
substitute an internal management structure for
market transactions to eliminate the costs of
negotiating, writing, and enforcing contracts. More
than two decades later, his classic paper, “On
the Problem of Social Costs,” (Coase 1960) revo-
lutionized the way in which economists per-
ceived market and nonmarket solutions to the
problem of externalities. In this paper, Coase
argued that the problem of externalities cannot
be examined without looking at the institutional
setting of the problem and the size of transac-
tion costs. According to the Nobel committee,
the latter paper is the most cited paper in eco-
nomics in the years since its publication. His
work has stimulated research in the areas of law
and economics, antitrust economics, regulation,
public choice, and the role of government in
economic society. The purpose of this article is
to offer an explanation of Coase’s contribution
to the analysis of the role of government.
Externalities
Until the work of Coase (1960), econo-
mists had a highly simplified view of the role of
markets. From Adam Smith, they believed that
the basic role of government is to establish the
rules of the game (defend property rights); from
A. C. Pigou (1932), they learned that it is worth-
while for the government to subsidize or tax
private activities whenever the market produces
too little of a good thing (such as education) or
too much of a bad thing (such as pollution).
Such externalities (unpriced benefits or costs)
constituted the main exception to the rule that
Adam Smith’s invisible hand will efficiently allo-
cate resources. Coase basically showed that
externalities may or may not require a govern-
mental solution; the need for a government
solution depends on the circumstances of each
case. In shifting the terms of the debate, Coase
single-handedly moved economics from pre-
suming specific roles for government action to
a more neutral position requiring detailed
analysis.
Let us reconsider a simple situation ex-
amined by Pigou and Coase: one agent’s profit-
maximizing decisions affect the profits of another
party through a technological external dis-
economy. For concreteness, imagine a railroad
engine is the source of fire-starting sparks to a
farmer’s crops. Pigou had argued that the rail-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 25 ECONOMIC REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 1996
road should be held liable for the damage
done to the farmer’s crops because, otherwise,
too many resources would be allocated to the
railroad. Pigou suggested that efficiency could
be brought about by imposing a tax on the
railroad.
Coase began his analysis with a simple
point: if the railroad is made liable to the
farmer, in a world of zero transaction costs, the
railroad and farmer would reach an agreement
themselves. Moreover, even if the railroad were
not liable, an agreement would be reached
with substantially the same allocation of re-
sources. As an example, suppose a railroad
could make $100 running one train per day
and $150 running two trains per day. The farmer
can make $150 planting one field or $160 plant-
ing two fields. If the fields are planted next to
the tracks, the railroad destroys $60 worth of
crops per train per field. It is assumed that
there is no problem of assessing damages.1
Tables 1, 2, and 3 describe three situa-
tions. Each row describes the consequences of
the railroad running no trains, one train, or two
trains per day. Each column shows the conse-
quences of the farmer’s planting no fields, one
field, or two fields. The lower-left-hand corner
of each cell shows the profits to the railroad;
the upper-right-hand corner of each cell shows
the profits to the farmer; if positive, the lower-
right-hand corner shows payments to third par-
ties (Table 3 only). In Table 1, the railroad must
directly compensate the farmer for damages to
his crops. In Table 2, the railroad has the right to
start fires on the farmer’s fields. Table 3 shows
an ideal Pigovian tax: the railroad is taxed by the
amount of the damage and a third party receives
the lump-sum amount of the tax revenues.
In any table, the total benefit to society is
the sum of the payoffs shown (ignoring con-
sumer surplus). In all three tables, the maximum
attainable total benefit is $190 and is reached
when one train is run and one field is planted.
In Table 1, the railroad is liable for dam-
ages inflicted and must pay $60 per train per
field to the farmer. When one train is run and
one field is planted, the railroad receives a pay-
off of $40 (= $100 – $60) and the farmer receives
a total payoff of $150 (the same as if there were
no railroad). While this is the social optimum, if
the railroad is running one train per day, the
farmer has an incentive to plant two fields be-
cause, with the payment of damages, the farmer
can make $160, more than can be made by
planting only one field. This would lower the
railroad’s profit to –$20. Clearly, in a world of
zero transaction costs, it would pay the railroad
to make an agreement with the farmer not to
plant the second field. The railroad could offer
the farmer, say, $11 not to plant the field, in-
creasing the railroad’s net profit to $29 and
increasing the farmer’s payoff to $161 (for a total
of $190 still).2
Coase then considered the alternative or
reciprocal situation in which the railroad has the
right to destroy whatever crops are planted near
the tracks. In Table 2, if the farmer again plants
one field and the railroad runs one train, the
railroad earns $100 while the farmer earns only
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$90 (= $150 – $60). However, now the railroad
has an incentive to run another train, increasing
its profits to $150 and lowering the farmer’s
profits to $30. But, again, in a world of zero
transaction costs, it would now pay the farmer
to offer, say, $51 to the railroad to not run the
second train, raising the railroad’s payoff to $151
and raising the farmer’s from $30 to $39. This is
again the social optimum, where the total
gain to society is still $190.
In comparing Tables 1 and 2, when there
is full and costless cooperation between the two
parties, the resulting allocation of resources is
the same: one field is planted and one train per
day is run. The only difference is the distribu-
tion of the spoils. This is the celebrated Coase
theorem: in a world of zero transaction costs,
the allocation of resources does not depend on
who has the property rights but rather on the
existence of well-defined rights.
Why was this analysis so innovative in
its impact on economics? To understand the
Coasian contribution, it is useful to go back to
the original Pigovian analysis of externalities. In
Table 3, the railroad pays a tax to the govern-
ment equal to the damages imposed on the
farmer. The tax revenue is then redistributed to
a third party, shown in the lower-right-hand
corner of each cell. If the tax revenue is paid to
the farmer, we are again back to Table 1, and it
is necessary for the railroad to bribe the farmer
into planting only one field.3 If the tax is paid to
a third party, a profit-maximizing railroad will
run one train per day if the farmer plants one
field; a profit-maximizing farmer will plant one
field if the railroad runs one train per day. The
total benefit to society is again $190 (= $40 + $90
+ $60). The optimum appears to be achieved
without any necessity of negotiation between
the parties. It is an equilibrium because if the
farmer is planting one field, the railroad maxi-
mizes its income with one train per day; and if
the railroad is running one train per day, the
farmer maximizes his income with one field.
The problem with the Pigovian analysis is
threefold.4 The first is that the optimum solution
need not be the only equilibrium. In this ex-
ample, there are two equilibria. Imagine the
railroad just happens to come along after the
farmer has planted two fields (the optimum with
no railroad). Then if there is a Pigovian tax, the
railroad would not find it optimal to run any
trains. This, too, is an equilibrium because there
is no incentive for either the railroad or the
farmer to deviate from zero trains and two fields.5
But this solution is not Pareto-optimal. The total
social surplus is only 160 instead of 190 as in the
previous equilibrium. If we take the reverse,
where the farmer comes along after the railroad
is established, the railroad initially would run
two trains per day and the farmer would have
the incentive to plant one field, causing the
railroad to run only one train per day. In other
words, historical accident can determine the equi-
librium and whether or not the solution is opti-
mal in the case of a Pigovian tax scheme.
The second problem is that if the farmer
receives the payments to the government (the
$60) and is aware of the link between his ac-
tions and government payments, he again will
have an incentive to plant two fields. Therefore,
there is still no solution to the externalities prob-
lem. To solve the externalities problem by a
Pigovian tax requires that the tax receipts be
paid to a third party who will not alter his or her
behavior as a consequence of the payment. But
as our first point illustrates, this is a necessary
but not a sufficient condition due to the possibil-
ity of multiple equilibria.
The Pigovian solution seems rather strange
because who in society would push for a tax on
the railroad other than the farmer who is having
to suffer the damages created by the sparks?
Why pay the tax revenue to a third party? But if
the tax revenue is paid to the farmer, we again
have the original problem of having to make an
agreement between the railroad and the farmer
to reach the optimal solution. Thus, the Pigovian
“solution” is no solution at all.
A third problem with the Pigovian solution
can be seen if we broaden the example. Sup-
pose that we are discussing the damages im-
posed by smokers on nonsmokers. There are
many smokers and many nonsmokers. It is clear
that in the real world, smokers and nonsmokers
cannot negotiate to reach the optimum because
the transaction costs are prohibitive. It seems to
make sense, therefore, for the government to
step in and, say, impose a Pigovian tax on
smokers. But this has one problem: who is
going to get the revenue from the tax? Tullock
(1967), in a path-breaking article, pointed out
that people in a democratic society will compete
for tax revenues. This competition for revenues
can dissipate all or part of the gains because
lobbying has opportunity costs (hiring lawyers,
public relations experts, word processors, and
so forth). Thus, in Table 3, if the $60 revenue is
dissipated by such actions, the total gain to
society from a Pigovian tax would be only $130
if the farmer planted one field and the railroad
ran only one train per day.
A precursor of Coase was the great institu-
tional economist and legal scholar, John R. Com-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 27 ECONOMIC REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 1996
mons. According to Commons (1923, 326), judges
have often ruled that “taxes may not be used for
private purposes.” But Commons pointed out
that taxes are always used for some type of
private purpose. The question is whether that
private purpose is tinged with enough public
interest to make the taxes worthwhile. For ex-
ample, property taxes in many localities are
used to support “public education.” Teachers’
unions consistently lobby to increase their share
of the public purse, and the educational bureau-
cracies expand at the cost of sacrificing the very
goal of teaching students. This example can be
multiplied many times. Taxes imposed on the
working population are used to support large
segments of the nonworking population. Gov-
ernment employees become a central clientele
to the political party that hires them.
Coase’s basic insight is really that we can-
not separate the analysis of externalities from
the real-world situation we are describing. What
we have just said simply shows that there is
no a priori role for government policy in con-
trolling externalities. It does not say that there is
no role. But instead of concocting abstract
theories about externalities and what to do
about them, the Coasian research agenda re-
quires the economist to actually study the
detailed setting in which the alleged externality
is taking place. We must examine the institu-
tions, the property rights, and the costs of con-
tracting in each and every instance. As Coase
(1993, 97) once put it, “What I object to is
mindless abstraction or the kind of abstraction
which does not help us to understand the
working of the economic system.”
Positive transaction costs and
property rights
A transaction cost is a cost of using a
market. “There are negotiations to be under-
taken, contracts have to be drawn up, inspec-
tions have to be made, arrangements have to be
made to settle disputes” (Coase 1992, 715). It is
important to distinguish between what has been
called the Coase theorem and what I will call the
Coasian hypothesis. This is the hypothesis that
the legal system under a system of positive
transaction costs “will have a profound effect on
the working of the economic system and may in
certain respects be said to control it” (Coase
1992, 718).
To illustrate this at the simplest level, in
the parable of the railroad and the adjacent
farmer, suppose it costs the railroad $10 or the
farmer $20 for each planted field to build a
protective firewall. This is a transaction cost
because, from the point of view of the railroad,
it is a cost of preventing damages. When a
lawyer is hired to write a contract, it is done to
protect the firm in a legal dispute. Whether the
railroad is liable or not, a firewall will be built
by profit-minded agents. But now we get a
different allocation of resources. If railroad is
liable, it will run two trains a day and the
farmer will plant two fields. But if the farmer
must build the firewall, the farmer will only
plant one field because of the exorbitant cost of
protecting two fields and diminishing returns.
The major implication, then, of the existence of
transaction costs is that changing the rules of
liability has an impact on resource allocation.
The Coasian hypothesis suggests that it
makes a real difference what the law stipulates
about what is legal and not legal. If the law
imposes the rule that companies are responsible
for whatever illnesses are caused by their prod-
ucts and the standard of proof is relatively am-
biguous, there will be a strong tendency for the
product to disappear from the marketplace. In-
deed, there are many examples of products that
have disappeared in the United States that can
be obtained elsewhere.6
Whether or not the change in the alloca-
tion of resources is beneficial requires a detailed
study of costs and benefits. For example, a
recent study by Richard Manning (1994) of the
effect of changes in the tort law on the prices of
childhood vaccines shows that the price of the
DPT vaccine has increased by 2,000 percent
over the past decade, with 96 percent of the
price increase due to litigation costs.
Public goods
In the classic treatment of public goods
(Samuelson 1955), it is supposed that public
goods exhibit two characteristics: nonrivalry in
consumption and the inability of providers to
exclude users. A lighthouse has been used by
economists of the stature of John Stuart Mill,
A. C. Pigou, and Paul Samuelson as an example
of a pure public good (Coase 1974). Apparently,
the light from any lighthouse could be used by
any number of ships and no ship could be
excluded from using the light. Thus, the prob-
lem of free riding would make it difficult to
privately finance a lighthouse. Coase (1974) used
the lighthouse as a real-world illustration of his
method of examining the argument for govern-
ment interference into the economy. Coase sur-
veyed the history of lighthouses and discovered
that lighthouses were built by private parties
even though everyone within sight of the light-
house can use its services without any conges-28
tion costs. Coase simply pointed out that ships
usually arrive one at a time, they can be easily
identified, and if a captain never pays, the light
can simply be turned off, as it had throughout
the early history of the lighthouse. The light-
house operators also charged ships according to
their tonnage, so that the price paid roughly
corresponded to the benefits received by the
owner of the ship. This is a market: a price is
charged, and if the price is not paid, the next
time the service will be denied. The institutional
structure of production is important. If the light-
house is made liable for any accidents caused by
turning off the light, suddenly a service that
could be provided privately is turned into one
that will not be provided at all unless by some
governmental agency.
This point and our analysis of externalities
illustrate how even the greatest economists
cannot, through deductive reasoning, decide
whether government action is required to cor-
rect some perceived market failure. Some type
of institutional examination of the facts is neces-
sary before any policy prescription can be
reached.
Conclusion
In this article, I have tried to clarify the
debate that has raged over the Coase theorem
since its inception. Basically, Coase pointed to
a flaw in the argument for correcting market
failures. While public production or Pigovian
taxes might correct for market failures, theory
cannot solve the problem without a detailed
analysis of the institutional structure of the prob-
lem at hand. We pointed out that even if Pigo-
vian taxes can be calculated, the solution requires
(1) third-party payments, and (2) relatively small
costs due to the competition for government
revenues. As Coase (1990, 185) colorfully put
it, presumably recalling Humphrey Bogart in
the Maltese Falcon, “Such tax proposals are the
stuff that dreams are made of.” Similarly,
whether a good is public or private depends on
technology, transaction costs, and the institu-
tions of the economy. At the same time, while
there is no a priori argument for government
intervention, there is also no a priori argument
for laissez faire. Each case must be decided on
the pragmatic principle of what works best in
the real world.
Notes
I wish to thank Stephen Brown for his valuable com-
ments on an earlier version of this article. The article
was stimulated by the author’s communications with
Paul Samuelson over the penetrating analysis of Coase
in Samuelson (1995). The current essay does not
answer Samuelson’s questions but simply tries to
clarify the nature of the Coasian debate.
1 Some might raise the issue that a farmer might locate
next to the tracks just to sue the railroad. This is really
just a transaction cost in disguise. We are assuming
here that the example represents the technological
opportunities available to the society as well as all the
possibilities. The conclusions would not be changed
by assuming N farmers, each with some clear-cut
damage. If a farmer has the option to locate else-
where with the same fecundity, there is no externality
to worry about. I am indebted to Steve Brown for this
point.
2 Paul Samuelson (1995) has raised the issue of bar-
gaining and negotiation failures. But this is, once
again, a situation in which there are costs of contract-
ing. The zero-transaction-cost world in economics is
like the law of inertia when no forces are operating on
an object: nothing stops perfection.
3 See Coase (1990, 151) and Baumol (1972).
4 The following analysis does not try to replicate the
views of Coase (see, for example, Coase 1990,
179–85).
5 It is an established point in economic theory that in the
presence of externalities, competitive behavior can
result in multiple equilibria (see Ruffin 1972).
6 Diving boards are disappearing from neighborhood
pools in the United States (Investor’s Business Daily,
May 13, 1996, A2). See also Peter W. Huber (1988,
155–61), for other examples, such as contraceptive
devices and leprosy drugs.
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